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ABSTRACT: In his early essay on the affirmative character 
of culture, dating back to 1937, Marcuse states that the 
whole sphere of material production is generally 
regarded as being tainted by misery and injustice, and in 
principle alien to beauty, enjoyment and happiness. In 
the 1920s Dewey had made a similar point, noting that 
our understanding of work as a synonym for mere labour 
– something uninteresting and toilsome, which leaves no 
legitimate room for pleasure – is the result of a 
regressive habit, connected to an exclusive emphasis on 
profit. Setting out from different points of departure, 
both scholars assert the possibility to enjoy richer forms 
of life here and now – ones sensuously, emotively and 
imaginatively more satisfying. The present paper tries to 
distinguish the different meanings which Dewey and 
Marcuse attribute to the aesthetic aspects of our 
experiences, by stressing their common assumption that 
these aspects are one of the basic elements in our 
interactions with the surrounding world and that they 
play a decisive role in our lives. Political emancipation, as 
defined by Marx, does not cover the sum of human 
emancipation in all of its complexity, particularly because 
the more anthropologically oriented meaning of the term 
also includes the satisfaction of some aesthetic needs 
which must be taken into account in order to attain 
“thicker” forms of freedom. While for both Dewey and 
Marcuse at the beginning of the 20th century 
consumption remained the only recognized venue for 
pleasure, it must be acknowledged that political 
economy and marketing are now increasingly and 
pervasively exploiting the “esthetic hunger” of individuals 
in contemporary post-industrial societies. Nonetheless, 
for both Dewey and Marcuse this circumstance neither 
means that we must pursue a purely negative form of 
culture and art nor that we have to look for completely 
rational agents, whose conduct exclusively stems from 
clear and distinct ideas and arguments, with no aesthetic 
or qualitative influence on their deliberations. The point 
is rather to suggest alternative ways of satisfying our 
aesthetic needs, but also of making subtler distinctions 
between different forms of consumption, pleasure and 
enjoyment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is well known that historically there has been no 
fruitful theoretical exchange between the most 
outstanding figures of classical pragmatism, on the one 
side, and the Marxist tradition, on the other, including 
the exponents of its cultural heritage, that is the various 
voices of the Frankfurt school.
1
 Marcuse himself wrote a 
review of Dewey's Logic. A Theory of Inquiry in 1940, 
widely reflecting the cultural prejudices of his own 
philosophical school with regard to the American one.
2
 
Although I agree with Peirce and Dewey when they 
stress the basic role which our beliefs and habits of 
thinking and behaving play in the comprehension of our 
surroundings and in the configuration of our categories, I 
believe it is time to give up bad, routine habits of 
thought in favour of more intelligent or simply more 
open-minded ones and to try to see whether a 
discussion on these subjects can suggest new 
perspectives or help us find alternative solutions. 
This premise helps me introduce my present topic: the 
role played by the aesthetic aspects or aesthetic 
dimension of our living with respect to a form of 
emancipation that is wholly human rather than 
exclusively political. 
With no pretence to philological accuracy, I would argue 
                                                 
1
 Of course I am referring here to the first generation of 
the Frankfurt school, while it is well known that 
“pragmatism and critical theory are now far less ignorant 
of, or hostile to, one another” (Deen, P. 2010. 
“Dialectical vs Experimental Method: Marcuse's Review 
of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry”, Transactions of 
the Charles S. Peirce Society, 46/2, p.243), primarily 
because of Jürgen Habermas' work. On Dewey and 
Marxism see Gavin, W.J. (ed.) 1988. Context over 
Foundation: Dewey and Marx, Dordrecht: Reidel and 
more recently the essay by John Ryder, Naturalism 
pragmatist et Marxisme, in Frega R. (ed.) 2015, Le 
pragmatisme comme philosophie sociale et politique, 
Lormont: BDL Editions, pp.157-202. On pragmatism and 
the Frankfurt School, see Jay, M. 1973. Dialectical 
Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950, Boston and 
Toronto: Little Brown and Company and Joas, H. 1993. 
Pragmatism and Social Theory, Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
2
 See Marcuse, H. 2010. “Review of John Dewey's Logic: 
The Theory of Inquiry”, Transactions of the Charles S. 
Peirce Society, 46/2, translated by Deen, P., pp.258-265 
and Deen, P. 2010. cit. 
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that the notorious distinction between political and 
human emancipation – traced by Marx in his famous 
essay on the Jewish question in 1844
3
 – may be invoked 
here in support of the thesis that both for John Dewey 
and for Herbert Marcuse real human emancipation 
cannot be confined to equality before the law.  
Of course this is not to deny that other factors are 
structurally crucial for the development of a good form 
of shared living. It is almost trivial to say that access to 
survival resources together with both negative and 
positive forms of freedom are necessary preconditions. 
However, the above-mentioned philosophers, although 
from different perspectives, share the assumption that a 
form of democratic, non-repressive society must take 
into account the concrete man, as opposed to the 
abstract citizen, with his biological and existential needs 
to be satisfied and his desire to enjoy life, i.e. to achieve 
a sensuously, emotionally and imaginatively richer form 
of living. This also means considering the basically social 
structure of human living, including both aggressive and 
sympathetic aspects, in order to shape a new kind of 
non-repressive society (Marcuse) or a democracy 
understood as “a life of free and enriching communion” 
(Dewey).
4
 In other words, it is my contention that 
according to both authors the aesthetic aspects of our 
typically human form of life play a central role in the 
configuration of our societies and have deep political 
implications. 
The outstanding role played by the aesthetic in 
configuring our forms of life is evident first of all for both 
Marcuse and Dewey in its negative aspects, in both 
political and economic terms. In Freedom and Culture 
Dewey points out that the emotions and imagination are 
much more powerful than information and reason as a 
                                                 
3 
Marx, K. 1978. Zur Judenfrage, in Marx, K. - Engels, F. 
1978, Werke Band I, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, pp.347-377. 
4
 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public and Its Problems, in The 
Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 2: 1925-1927, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, p.350. Dewey is here explicitly recalling Walt 
Whitman. 
means of shaping public sentiment and opinion. He 
shows just how deep totalitarian control can go by 
affecting feelings, desires and emotions.
5
 Totalitarian 
regimes are able to exploit the human need to belong to 
a community, the human desire to escape responsibility, 
as well as our impulse towards submission and our 
desire to find satisfaction in shared creative activities.
6
 
On the other hand, Marcuse's “Political Preface” to Eros 
and Civilization emphasizes a typical feature of present-
day affluent societies: the fact that authorities have 
almost no need to coercively control citizens, because 
they are now able to satisfy human erotic and aggressive 
drives both by means of the market, by transforming 
goods into libidinal objects, and by means of cultural 
industries, by producing creative sublimations of human 
instincts.
7
 
However, for both authors these circumstances do not 
mean that we have to deny human needs, desires and 
emotions because they let us be controlled by external 
forces. This is a rather peculiar stance if compared to the 
long philosophical tradition going from Plato to Adorno.  
With particular reference to Marcuse, it must be said 
that this attitude strongly characterizes his thought in 
contrast to the positions of the other members of the 
Frankfurt School, hence reinforcing my hypothesis that a 
fertile comparison can be traced between Dewey and 
Marcuse from the point of view of the correlations 
between aesthetics and politics. By contrast, Adorno's 
prejudices against any form of aesthetic enjoyment, 
seen as a means of supporting and reinforcing the status 
quo, are well known.
8
 In opposition to this negative 
philosophical attitude, both Dewey and Marcuse – at 
least in his middle period – stress the structural role of 
                                                 
5
 Dewey, J. 1988. Freedom and Culture, in The Later 
Works, 1925-1953, Volume 13: 1938-1939, Carbondale 
and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, p.70. 
6
 Ibidem, pp.88-89.  
7
 Marcuse, H. 1966. Eros and Civilization. A Philosophical 
Inquiry into Freud, Boston: Beacon. 
8
 See the section entitled “Artistic enjoyment” in Adorno, 
T.W. 1984. Aesthetic Theory, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
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human sensitive and sensuous needs and search for 
alternative, non-regressive forms of human satisfaction 
through the model of a non-repressive society or a 
democratic way of life, capable of taking into account 
the fact that man is not just a political animal but also a 
“consuming” one in search of enjoyment and an 
enhancement of life.
9
 
But this close connection between aesthetics and politics 
can be grasped even through a merely exterior 
observation of the two philosophers' production. The 
essays and books from Marcuse's so-called middle and 
late period (from 1932 to 1978)
10
, while having a strong 
political focus, always devote a chapter or paragraph to 
a discussion of the “aesthetic dimension”, or of a “new 
sensibility”. Dewey, in turn, devoted an important 
chapter of his Experience and Nature and a whole book 
to the aesthetic aspects of our experience and to 
reflections on the arts; and these texts were written 
precisely in the two decades when he published his most 
important political works, that is the 1920s and 1930s.
11
 
Furthermore, with regard to this point, it is worth 
stressing the fact that these were the years immediately 
preceding and following the Great Depression, that is 
the first major crisis of a highly industrialized society, 
combined with the emergence of financial capitalism. 
This factor leads me to point out a first similarity 
between the two philosophers: the methodological 
starting point they share. Both start from the material 
conditions of existence or – with reference to Dewey's 
more anthropologically oriented stance – from the 
material culture they belong to. The intellectual 
                                                 
9
 Dewey, J. 1984. The Public and Its Problems, cit., p.321. 
10
 See Reitz, C. 2000. Art, Alienation, and the Humanities. 
A Critical Engagement with Herbert Marcuse, Albany NY: 
State University of New York Press, who distinguishes 
three different periods in Marcuse's philosophical 
production (p.11). 
11
 Cf. Dewey, J. 1988. Experience and Nature, in The Later 
Works, 1925-1953, Volume 1:1925, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press and 
Dewey, J. 1989. Art as Experience, in The Later Works, 
1925-1953, Volume 10: 1934, Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. 
dispositions they critically consider – on the one hand 
the so-called affirmative character of culture, on the 
other the traditionally modern form of individualism – 
are considered to be deeply connected to the 
technological and economic (industrial) means of 
producing resources and to the financial and political 
ways of managing them. In either case, this does not 
amount to the sort of determinism which follows as the 
ultimate result of a certain stiff Marxist tradition; that is, 
it does not imply the thesis that our cultural 
superstructures are caused by and can be reduced to 
material conditions. Rather, it means that we have to 
take into account the peculiar qualities – not only the 
natural qualities, but also the social or economic ones – 
of the environment which we belong to and which we 
contribute to configure from within, even through our 
ideas about the way of interacting with these conditions, 
of managing them, of coping with them, and so on.
12
 
A second element of convergence, a rather conspicuous 
one, is that both Dewey and Marcuse – albeit in a 
completely independent manner from one another, of 
course – presuppose a broad conception of the aesthetic 
as an aspect of human experience or of human life as 
such, whose manifestations in properly artistic activities 
and products represent one aspect of the phenomenon, 
without assimilating it completely. This point, in my 
opinion, is closely related to a third factor, which plays a 
relevant role in both the philosophies we are 
considering, that is the rooting of the aesthetic 
dimension in the biological, naturalistic aspects of our 
humanity. I believe that this kind of anthropological 
attitude towards the aesthetic is connected, on the one 
hand, to the deep influence which Schiller and his Letters 
on the Aesthetic Education of Man exercised on 
Marcuse,
13
 who originally reinterpreted them by means 
                                                 
12
 See Ryder, J. (cit.) on materialism. 
13
 Schiller, F. 1992. Über die ästhetischen Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Schiller, F. 1992, 
Theoretischen Schriften, Volume 8 of Friedrich Schiller. 
Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bände, Frankfurt a.M.: 
Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, pp.556-676. English 
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of Freudian categories; and, on the other hand, to 
Dewey's non-dogmatic reading of Darwin's writings, 
which was originally connected to William James' 
generally naturalistic and continuistic attitude. 
Nonetheless, these important, if partial, convergences 
should not prevent us from noting some great 
differences with regard to the ultimate results of 
Marcuse's and Dewey's respective enquiries, which have 
a lot to do with their conception of the arts and their 
idea of high and mass culture. Another particularly 
serious point of divergence is represented by Marcuse's 
final negative and consciously transcendent stance with 
respect to the specific conditions we live in and Dewey's 
idea of changing things from the inside, but also to his 
genuinely pluralistic stance, based on the idea of seeing 
not just what is wrong in our lives, but also what works 
differently and might have unexpected, fruitful 
consequences. 
The first aspect to be considered, in my opinion, are the 
convergences between Marcuse's criticism of so-called 
affirmative culture and Dewey's interpretation of the old 
individualist paradigm. Both these kinds of criticisms 
focus on aesthetic, emotive and imaginative factors that 
are deeply entrenched in society we live in, considered 
from the point of view of its economic and political 
configurations. 
Secondly, it is necessary to examine the anthropological 
meanings of the aesthetic aspects of our interactions 
with the natural and naturally social world, which in both 
cases do not coincide with artistic practices, objects or 
events. In both authors aesthetics appears to have 
political implications, as it concerns the very social 
conditions we share as human livings. 
Finally, I will conclude by pointing out some 
divergences between the two philosophers, which 
remain important even if we can appreciate some 
                                                                       
translation: Schiller, F. 1994. On the Aesthetic Education 
of Man in a Series of Letters, Bristol: Thoemmes. 
affinities on this topic, at least in a certain phase of 
their philosophical production. 
1. Critical convergences 
As a point of departure, I would suggest focusing on the 
common ground that may be found between Dewey's 
critical attitude towards the traditional modern version 
of individualism and Marcuse's criticism of so-called 
affirmative culture, which finds a complementary 
development in his analysis of the pros and cons of 
hedonism.
14
 
In 1929 Dewey argued that the material culture we live 
in deeply influences the kind of men we are and the 
beliefs we hold.
15
 That is to say that technologically 
advanced means of industrial production and the kind of 
financial management exclusively oriented towards 
private profit are not merely exterior factors in respect 
to our identities; they are not marginal aspects we 
should entrust to economists and financial managers, in 
order to preserve a genuinely individual space of 
spiritual freedom and a distinctly cultural dimension. 
This is precisely the heritage of the old individualism, 
based on the prejudice that the individual is first of all an 
isolated and independent entity, whose happiness is to 
be pursued in an exclusively spiritual sphere, legitimating 
– on the earthly side – a laissez-faire economy of 
unrestrained private wealth accumulation. 
From this point of view, Dewey's contention is that the 
new forms of association produced by the new means of 
                                                 
14
 See Marcuse, H. 1965. Über den affirmativen 
Charakter der Kultur, in Kultur und Gesellschaft I, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp.56-109. English 
translation: Marcuse, H. 1968. The Affirmative Character 
of Culture, in Negations. Essays in Critical Theory, 
Boston: Beacon, pp.65-98. Cf. also Marcuse, H. 1965. Zur 
Kritik des Hedonismus, in Kultur und Gesellschaft I, 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, pp.128-168. English 
translation: Marcuse, H. 1968. On Hedonism, in 
Negations. Essays in Critical Theory, Boston: Beacon, 
pp.119-150. 
15
 Dewey, J. 1988. Individualism Old and New, in The 
Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 5: 1929-1930, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, pp.41-123. 
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production, while generally characterized by 
depersonalization, superficial forms of coexistence and 
mere consumerist satisfaction, can play a positive role in 
making the limits of old individualism clear: its elitist 
vocation, its dualism between mind and body and its 
responsibility in bestowing supremacy on the intellectual 
realm to the detriment of the satisfying of human 
material needs. From this point of view, we will see that 
these new forms of association play a role that is similar 
to that performed by hedonistic issues in Marcuse's 
criticism of affirmative culture. 
A very important point for the present argument is the 
fact that according to Dewey in order to develop new 
forms of individualized and associated living we need a 
different sensibility that does not wholly correspond to 
deliberative reason. It is not enough to change the 
explicit reasons for our behaviour: we need to get to the 
emotional or qualitative basis of our habits and beliefs, 
we need to meet the human need not simply for an 
alleged crystal-clear conscience, but also for a fuller and 
more satisfying life with others and with the 
environmental conditions we live in.  
This peculiar connection between materialism and the 
claim to a more integral form of human realization, 
capable of taking into account our aesthetic needs, can 
also be found in Marcuse's essay on the affirmative 
character of culture, dating back to 1937. His point of 
departure is amazingly similar to the pragmatist attitude: 
Marcuse criticizes the separation of what is useful and 
necessary from what is beautiful and enjoyable 
introduced by the ancient Greeks, and which implies a 
depreciation of human sensibility – so that the dualistic 
opposition between body and soul appears to have 
strong political implications, as is often stressed in 
Dewey's work. On the one hand, this separation of the 
useful from the beautiful and enjoyable is seen by 
Marcuse in his 1937 essay as the beginning of a process 
leading to the legitimation of what he calls “bourgeois 
praxis”, that is the typical middle-class pursuit of one's 
own profit at the expense of other members of society. 
On the other hand, this separation is understood as 
confining happiness to the spiritual realm of culture, as 
basically entailing the need to transcend the empirical 
conditions of life. A purely interior kind of freedom is 
used to justify social and economic inequalities. The arts 
themselves contribute to this kind of situation, by being 
perceived as the only sphere for beauty, the only one in 
which spiritual enjoyment is permitted, while remaining 
essentially irrelevant to the conditions of material life.
16
 
From this point of view, Marcuse acknowledges 
hedonism's claim to meet human sensible needs as a 
progressive one, struggling against the socially regressive 
idea of confining happiness to an alleged purely interior 
dimension.
17
 Aside from this perspective, even the boom 
in mass consumption reflects people's claim to lead a 
happier and sensuously richer life; at the same time it 
exposes the elitist character of affirmative culture 
together with its complicity in the unequal distribution 
of resources.
18
 
It is possible to argue, therefore, that a significant 
convergence between Dewey and Marcuse would 
appear to emerge with respect to their understanding of 
                                                 
16
 On this point it must be noted that Marcuse offers a 
different interpretation of Schiller's Briefen (cit.) in his 
essay on the affirmative character of culture compared 
to other texts of his. Even if the subject cannot be dealt 
with in this paper for evident reasons of length and 
opportunity, in my opinion Marcuse’s understanding of 
Schiller's philosophical work played a crucial role in the 
development of his thought; in particular we find a 
similar oscillation in Schiller and in Marcuse between the 
idea of an emancipation from alienation through art, 
leading to human fulfilment, and the idea of art and 
beauty as opposed to empirical reality. 
17
 Cf. Marcuse's essay on hedonism. 
18
 It must be noted that this position was not always 
coherently sustained by Marcuse, who reached more 
regressive positions in his later essay The Aesthetic 
Dimension, dating back to 1978 (Marcuse, H. 1978. The 
Aesthetic Dimension. towards a Critique of Marxist 
Aesthetics, Boston: Beacon). For a wide-ranging and 
sharp interpretation of Marcuse's theoretical tensions or 
even ambiguities see Reitz, C. (cit.), who convincingly 
describes these aspects of Marcuse's thought as the 
transition from an idea of art as something that goes 
against alienation to a conception of art as deliberate 
alienation or a moving away from material conditions of 
life in late-capitalist societies. 
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life conditions in highly industrialized societies, although 
the two philosophers reached these conclusions by 
completely independent paths. According to both, in 
societies of this kind human lives seem to be divided into 
separate realms, one devoted to work exclusively for 
profit, and another devoted to culture and the arts, 
where – as already noted – enjoyment is perceived as 
legitimate but also as basically irrelevant to the 
conditions of material life.
19
 To complete the picture and 
update it to the present day, we should add a third 
component, that is the ever-expanding realm of 
consumption, in which enjoyment is allowed and indeed 
encouraged, but of course not primarily for the sake of 
human happiness. While both Dewey and Marcuse were 
able to detect this trend when it was first emerging, it 
must be acknowledged that now political economy and 
marketing are increasingly and pervasively exploiting the 
“esthetic hunger”
20
 of individuals in contemporary post-
industrial societies. 
2. Understanding the aesthetic 
But what about the meaning of “aesthetic” for these 
authors? 
It must be recognized that they do not share exactly 
the same view of the aesthetic aspects of our life; 
nonetheless, some interesting similarities can be 
usefully summed up in order to then develop a more 
                                                 
19
 There is also another point of convergence to be 
noted here, that is Dewey's and Marcuse's idea of work. 
Although there are some ambiguities in Marcuse's 
writing on this subject, in this paper as well as in the 
later essay on liberation the German philosophers 
deeply criticizes the one-sided conception of work as 
exclusively oriented towards profit, while confining 
spiritual enjoyment to the realm of culture and of the 
arts. On this subject see also Marcuse’s essay “Über die 
philosophischen Grundlagen des 
 wirtschaftwissenschaftlichen Begriff der Arbeit”, Archiv 
für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, 69, pp.257-
292. (English translation: On the Philosophical 
Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics, in 
Marcuse, H. 2005: Heideggerian Marxism, edited by 
Wolin, R. and Abromeit, J., Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, pp.122-150). 
20
 This formula can be found in Dewey, J. 1989. Art as 
Experience, cit., p.12. 
detailed analysis of Dewey's and Marcuse's views on 
the subject. 
The first thing to say is that clearly both philosophers do 
not confine the aesthetic dimension to the arts – neither 
to art products nor to artistic production and reception. 
The arts are envisaged as possible intensifications, 
enhancements or deepenings of some aesthetic traits of 
our experiences, on the grounds of their basic continuity 
with experience. Alternatively, the arts are understood 
as possible sublimations of erotic or life instincts, but 
they are not seen to cover the whole range of meanings 
of the aesthetic.  
A second common aspect is constituted by a kind of 
naturalistic stance, oriented towards the biological roots 
of the aesthetic, with a focus, on the one hand, on 
human organic dependence on a natural and naturally 
social environment, and, on the other, on human 
instinctual nature. In both cases this view does not 
amount to a kind of reductionism making higher forms 
of human behaviour causally dependent upon physical 
structures, and dissolving the former into the latter. 
Rather, in both Dewey and Marcuse a kind of 
anthropologically oriented stance can be found which 
has to do with the dynamic, historical and even social 
configurations of our structurally dependent human 
nature, of our ultimately being living creatures. In this 
sense my contention will be that for both authors the 
aesthetic is ultimately connected to a tendency to 
enhance life. 
A third correlated aspect regards their common, if 
independent, struggle against the dualism between body 
and mind, body and soul, sensibility and rationality, 
which is linked to an aspiration to more integral – as 
opposed to one-sided – forms of life and satisfying 
consummatory experiences. Let us begin with Dewey. 
I would argue that the word 'aesthetic' for Dewey is first 
of all understood as an adjective or as an adverb 
characterizing our immediate interactions with our 
environment as being favourable or harmful for us, 
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comfortable and welcoming or dangerous and 
disturbing. In Experience and Nature Dewey says that 
there is no doubt that things surrounding us, whole 
situations and other men and women are first of all 
perceived as sweet, gentle and charming, or as bitter, 
painful, disgusting. They make us enjoy or suffer, expand 
or feel oppressed. There is nothing mysterious in this 
phenomenon, because it is simply based on the human 
structural dependence on a natural and naturally social 
environment at all life levels. We are not primarily 
abstract minds, disembodied consciousnesses, 
completely autonomous subjects; we are not at all 
monadic entities, but rather living organisms, 
characterized by an outstanding high level of 
vulnerability to life conditions. For this reason the world 
around us affects us immediately before we can distance 
ourselves from these qualitative, affective or aesthetic 
meanings, before we can reflect and analyse the 
situations we experience from within and the various 
factors we interact with in view of other possible 
interactions. This is, of course, the beginning of inquiry, 
which is to say the method of intelligence, but it must be 
acknowledged that it is based on an aesthetic 
background.
21
 We could speak of sensibility here: this is 
the reason for Dewey's recovery of the word “esthetic” 
based on its ancient Greek root – a use essentially 
shared by William James. However, in this case speaking 
of sensibility does not imply that the word “esthetic” 
primary refers to allegedly given sense data, but rather 
that it entails sensitive, affective, sensuous qualities. 
We might formally sum up this meaning of the aesthetic 
aspects of our experience as a function of the structural 
dependence of human life upon the world. Or we could 
radicalize this thesis by suggesting that the source of 
                                                 
21
 On this point, we might recall that James and Peirce 
also stressed the structural role of the aesthetic, 
qualitative or affective aspects on human cognition, 
choices and behaviours. However, I believe that Dewey 
more clearly connected these aspects to our 
dependence – as living beings – on the environment, by 
interpreting them in a way consistent with his own 
staunchly cultural-naturalistic perspective.  
aesthetic meanings lies in human biological dependence, 
vulnerability or exposition to the environment and to 
other human beings, so that it is here that we find the 
core of Dewey's cultural naturalism. The biological 
truism Art as Experience reminds us is that life itself 
cannot take place in an abstract vacuum, but requires 
resources, energies and possibilities in the dynamic 
environment it belongs to and which it contributes to 
changing from within. Hence we enjoy or suffer our life 
conditions, because man is a peculiarly dependent kind 
of organism, whose answers to the environment are not 
previously fixed, but remain open, uncertain and plastic 
(or flexible), as well as structurally dependent on the 
actions of other men and women. 
The consequence of this last point is that our 
acknowledgement and perception of others are based 
on our aesthetic, qualitative experience of the 
environment we depend on, and therefore affect the 
very configuration of social groups at a basic level. 
A second meaning regards the use of the word aesthetic 
to characterize peculiarly integrated experiences, that is 
those interactions which come to their consummation 
and do not amount to mere routine, but can be 
perceived as significant for our lives, as capable of 
enhancing our energies and enriching our existence. A 
good equilibrium is acquired and life can flourish not at 
the expense of other environmental factors and other 
living organisms, but in expansive and enhancing ways. 
We should point out that these kinds of “consummatory 
experiences” prefigure non-competitive forms of 
enjoyment, in contrast to the classical economic 
interpretation of the pleasure pursued by consumers in 
terms of individual utility.
22
  
 
                                                 
22
 See Kanheman, D.-Wakker, P.P.-Sarin, R. 1997, “Back 
to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility”, 
Quaterly Journal of Economics, 112/2, pp.375-406 and 
Read, D. 2004, “Utility Theory from Jeremy Bentham to 
Daniel Kanheman”, Working Paper LSEOR 04-64: The 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
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Unfortunately these kinds of experiences supporting the 
flourishing of shared, satisfying forms of life are no 
longer to be found in many areas of advanced industrial 
society: we tend to take the lack of aesthetic qualities 
and enjoyment in work for granted, and to regard the 
lack of pleasure in science, morality or politics as a mark 
of seriousness and rigour. Moreover, we forget that 
things can work differently. These habits of thought and 
behaviours are so entrenched that they have become 
part of our identities and we need more intelligent kinds 
of habits to call them into question.
23
 
Dewey understands the arts as continuous with these 
qualities of human experiences, as their deliberate 
development and enhancement. But the point is that our 
contemporary societies have confined the arts to 
museums, and their enjoyment to narrow dimensions of 
our life, whose compartmentalization is the 
consequence of modes of productions based on an 
extremely high level of labour division and on the 
reduction of work itself to mere labour, toil, and lack of 
enjoyment. This leads us to our contemporary scenario, 
where – according to Dewey – the fruition of fine arts 
often proves regressive, confirming this sterile 
separation both on the existential level and on the social 
one, and where most people have to satisfy their 
“esthetic hunger”
 
by means of the market, in most cases 
through dissipative rather than life-enhancing aesthetic 
experiences.  
Nowadays Dewey's forecast should probably be 
extended to the bursting of the world art bubble – that is 
of the alleged independence of art – by the financial 
market and the deliberate exploitation of our sensibility 
and need for a more integrated and joyful life by sharp 
marketing strategies.
24
 
                                                 
23
 See Dewey, J. 1988. Human Nature and Conduct, in 
The Middle Works, 1899-1924, Volume 14: 1922, 
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
24
 See Cometti, J.-P. 2012. Art et facteurs d'art. 
Ontologies Friables, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de 
Dewey believed that philosophy must address the 
question of the unsuccessful functions that the arts very 
often play in our lives nowadays. His crucial point is that, 
if “democracy is ultimately a quality of social living”,
25
 
we have to consider how humans actually are – and 
might be – aesthetically nurtured, by distinguishing in 
each case those conditions which contribute to a shared 
sense of enjoyed life and community from those that 
satisfy strictly private needs and in the long run foster a 
drying up of individual, social and environmental 
energies. A full democracy cannot dismiss these kinds of 
issues, which play an important role in shaping our way 
of life and even the background of our moral and 
political judgements. 
Let us now come to Marcuse. I will focus on his middle 
period production, because in my opinion it is there that 
the German philosopher presents his most original ideas 
on aesthetic issues in relation to human emancipation 
and the notion of art. In particular, I will consider ch. 9 of 
Eros and Civilization, entitled “The aesthetic dimension”, 
together with the 1969 book An Essay on Liberation,
26
 
where two chapters are devoted to the subject of the 
possible biological basis of materialism and to that of a 
new sensibility. Despite its title, Marcuse's later essay 
The Aesthetic Dimension, from 1978, reverts to a much 
more conservative idea of art and culture, partially 
under the influence, I suppose, of Adorno's hegemonic 
position in the intellectual discussion of those years.
27
 
 
 
                                                                       
Rennes. 
25
 See Green, M.J. 2008. Pragmatism and Social Hope. 
Deepening Democracy in Global Contexts, New York: 
Columbia University Press, p.2. 
26
 Marcuse, H. 1969. An Essay on Liberation, Boston: 
Beacon. 
27
 Marcuse opened the 1978 essay on the aesthetic 
dimension by acknowledging his debt to Adorno's 
aesthetic theory and concluded it with a quotation from 
Adorno's and Horkeimer's Dialektik der Aufklärung 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer; English translation: Cumming J. 
1997, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London-New York: 
Verso). 
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In the books just quoted, Marcuse's conception of the 
aesthetic in relation to human life is clearly connected to 
his interpretation of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man and to his reading of Freud's theory of 
basic human instincts from a political and 
anthropological perspective. Freud's thesis about the 
repression of aggressive and sexual impulses as the 
ultimate cause of psychological diseases is reinterpreted 
by positing historical and political forms of repression of 
instinctive human needs – representing the heritage of 
our own species – as what makes the establishment of 
civilization possible. The key point is that according to 
Marcuse's writing from this period it is possible to 
envisage other kinds of civilization that are not 
oppressive, and to direct human erotic impulses in such 
a way as to ensure more satisfying human relations, 
happier forms of life, sensibly and sensuously richer 
experiences. 
From this point of view, what are aesthetic are first of all 
the needs connected to our senses, understood as 
sources of desire rather than simply as organs of 
perception. For sure, Marcuse saw in this Freudian 
category a new version of Schiller's Stofftrieb, that is the 
human attitude to find immediate satisfaction to our 
sensory and sensuous needs, to reproduce life, which 
has been historically submitted by human Formtrieb, 
understood as the attempt to impose a controlled order, 
a kind of pure rationality, characterized by its sharp 
separation from sensibility. 
In present-day society these sensible needs for “earthly 
gratification”
28
 tend to be translated almost exclusively 
into sexual forms. Marcuse points out that they are 
rather erotic instincts, that is impulses directed towards 
the enhancement and flourishing of life, which can find 
fulfilment in gratifying human relations – from erotic 
love to parental affection, from friendship to solidarity
29 
                                                 
28
 Cf. Reitz, C. cit., p.180. 
29
 There is a further problem here, in my opinion, that 
can only be briefly mentioned in this paper. It deals with 
Marcuse's ambiguity about the relationships among 
– together with the expansion of a sensuous and 
sensitive form of rationality. 
This means that for the German philosopher human 
erotic and aggressive instincts are not inevitably 
antisocial, as argued by Freud. On the contrary, they 
must be acknowledged as constitutive parts of our 
humanity and developed in pro-social directions – such 
as in friendship, love and solidarity – in such a way as to 
promote the establishment of non-repressive, happy 
societies. 
But we should add a further sphere of meaning of the 
aesthetic in our life. Marcuse originally developed 
Schiller's idea of the aesthetic state as an intermediate 
one, capable of acting as a mediator between sensibility 
and reason by making reason sensuous and sensibility 
fruitful, as opposed to merely dissipative. From this 
point of view, he speaks about a new sensibility and a 
new aesthetic ethos, capable of contributing to new 
forms of society and of satisfying the human need to live 
a more integrated life – a sensuously and imaginatively 
richer one, not condemned to fear and submission, but 
based on gratifying relations with other men and 
women, on living in a respected and nurtured 
environment, even on working with pleasure. Sensibility 
must be nurtured by the imagination and by the capacity 
to take other people's roles, thereby shaping an ethos 
capable of adequately fulfilling the basic human needs, 
instead of neglecting or repressing them. 
Marcuse was explicitly proposing a utopia, whereby art, 
instead of being structurally separated as a fictive realm, 
becomes a technical activity whose purpose is to 
configure a new, non-repressive form of civilization, and 
                                                                       
these different forms of life enhancing human relations: 
are they to be regarded as expansions or non-regressive 
sublimations of a primary sexual impulse (as it would be 
possible to argue from a Freudian perspective) or are 
they simply different kinds of relations among humans, 
that cannot be derived from an alleged primarily only 
sexual drive, because they contribute to human life 
reinforcement and flourishing in a plurality of ways? In 
my opinion in his Essay On Liberation Marcuse seems to 
support this second thesis. 
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the art product itself is not apart from reality but rather 
takes the form of a free and happy society, a good and 
beautiful one. 
3. Divergences on method (and why they matter) 
The late Marcuse abandoned this utopian view, 
returning to a more conservative conception of art. In 
The Aesthetic Dimension he reverted to the idea of art as 
an autonomous sphere and to an approval of the 
distinction between fine arts and high culture, on the 
one hand, and popular arts and culture on the other. 
Deeply disappointed by the contemporary development 
of affluent societies, he believed that the transcendent 
character of art
30
 had to be consciously used as a means 
to negate the current conditions of civilization. “Art as 
art”, he argued, that is art as structurally separated and 
even alienated from life and reality, must be 
intentionally pursued for its capacity to express an 
extreme refusal of present conditions, while every 
apparent democratization of culture must be rejected 
because it implies a confirmation of these conditions – 
because it definitely acts in collusion with them.  
To sum this up in a formula, Marcuse thought that art 
could not positively contribute to human emancipation, 
but had to play a merely negative, if still capital, role. 
What are the causes of this turnabout?
31 
I have already 
                                                 
30
 In my opinion, this emphasis on the supposedly 
transcendent character of art and beauty is related to 
Marcuse's reading of Schiller's Letters, where Schiller 
himself insists on the necessity to find a criterion for 
judging empirical forms of beauty from an extra-
empirical perspective. See also Schiller's Kallias, or on 
the Beautiful. (Schiller, F. 1992. Kallias oder über die 
Schönheit. Briefe an Gottfried Körner, in Schiller, F. 1992, 
Theoretischen Schriften, Volume 8 of Friedrich Schiller. 
Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bände, Frankfurt a.M.: 
Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, pp.276-329). 
31
 It is to be said that, as noted by Charles Reitz (cit.), this 
position is not new in the thought of Marcuse, who 
began his philosophical carrier by sharing a conservative 
vision of the Fine Arts, which he later criticized in his 
essays on the affirmative character of culture and on 
hedonism. Besides, it must be observed that even during 
its so-called middle period Marcuse's philosophy was 
characterized by some tensions with regard to these 
aspects. 
referred to Adorno's influence, which is explicitly 
recognized in this last essay through an 
acknowledgement, as well as various quotations and 
references. But of course there is more to it.  
With regard to Marcuse's theoretical perspective, one 
problem is constituted by the fact that the German 
philosopher makes the negative quality of art – its being 
apart, distinguished and transcendent from reality – an 
essential one, as though in every society in every part of 
the world and in every age artistic practices and 
productions were perceived as a realm separate from 
the life of the community they have developed from and 
which they belong to.  
Dewey, on the contrary, denounced the museum 
conception of the arts as being the result of historical, 
political and even of economic conditions. He strongly 
struggled to avoid the current opposition between art 
and labour, art and scientific inquiry, art and morality or 
politics, trying to rescue aesthetic qualities and artistic 
possibilities within our present society. From this point 
of view, we might say that Dewey more successfully 
reinterpreted Hegel's teaching about the so-called 
Vergangenheitscharacter der Kunst, that is art belonging 
– now, not always – to our own human past. In the past 
the arts were an integral part of human life, deeply 
contributing to establishing and nurturing values, 
standards of judgements, institutions and so on. But 
even now there are forms of art we immediately identify 
with – we do not need any form of mediation to undergo 
the influence of advertising images, just as young people 
immediately identify with pop music. The problem is 
that neither aesthetics nor the philosophy of art seem to 
consider these phenomena a matter of analysis: they 
prefer leaving them in the hands of sociology. 
But of course the greatest cause for Marcuse's turnabout 
was probably the overwhelming capacity of the economical 
system to spread everywhere, reaching every dimension of 
human life, the aesthetic one included, and of exploiting our 
deepest needs for its own profit. 
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This is an enormous problem, which cannot be neglected 
even from a Deweyan perspective. The ability of 
marketing to update the pattern of the homo 
oeconomicus by turning it into that of the homo 
sentimentalis is as astonishing as its skill to creatively 
exploit the wide range of possibilities opened by this 
change for its own sake.
32
 
I have no solution to offer myself: I can only suggest that 
Dewey's deeply pluralistic stance towards our material 
culture can prove more fruitful than Marcuse's great 
refusal, which ultimately remains based on a dualistic 
approach opposing oppressive contemporary societies 
and utopian ones. But are existing societies really so 
rigidly and pervasively defined? Are their boundaries so 
clearly determined and their practices systematically 
oriented towards a single, repressive goal? Are our ways 
of life completely modelled after the same standard, are 
our patterns and habits of behaviour and thought always 
the same? Or is it not the case that they very often 
conflict with one another and are called into question?
33
 
This strong opposition to an allegedly repressive 
civilization prevents us from finding different possibilities 
within this society and constitutes an obstacle for any 
attempt at transformative action. Dewey's pragmatist 
attitude instead tends to draw subtler distinctions within 
our material culture. In particular, I believe his attitude 
encourages us to distinguish between different habits of 
consumption, because alternative possibilities may be 
concealed behind new conditions of production and 
experience. We have some standards for discriminating 
between good and bad experiences, that is between 
inclusive and expansive ones or exclusive and regressive 
ones. For sure, these are not transcendental principles, 
but provisional and limited ones; sometimes they can be 
                                                 
32
 See Illouz, E., 2007. Cold Intimacies. The Making of 
Emotional Capitalism, Cambridge-Malden: Polity Press 
and Metelmann, J.-Beyes, T. (ed.), Die Macht der 
Gefühle: Emotionen in Management, Organisation und 
Kultur, Berlin: Berlin U.P. 
33
 See the Introduction to Judith Green's book (cit.) on 
the alleged 'clashes of civilization'. 
rather vague, at other times they are overt, but here and 
now we can – and must – perceive different colours or at 
least different nuances. 
Furthermore, a general Deweyan attitude remains open 
to the possibility of appreciating the means we use to 
achieve our ends.
34
 If – as is often the case – we focus 
exclusively on our ends, and treat our means as 'mere' 
means, we must understand the reasons for this and find 
alternative solutions, other ways of responding and 
acting. We must rely on the “method of intelligence”, 
while knowing that it is limited and provides no solutions 
or guarantees that can be valid in all circumstances.  
This is probably not enough – for sure, it is not much. But 
it is something important, if we share Dewey's idea that 
democracy has (also) to do with the felt quality of our 
lives. 
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